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We rely on the Master Beneficiary File to document a number of facts regarding claiming of 
Social Security benefits and quality of date of birth data in administrative files. We then assess 
the impact of changes in retirement incentives that have taken place since 2000 on claiming. We 
find evidence of non-trivial misreporting or clerical errors in the dates of births that give rise to 
systematic patterns but nevertheless appear to be fairly random. We also confirm significant 
tendency to claim in January or on birthdays, but we find that these patterns are still sensitive to 
incentive effects. Relying on the discontinuity in the Early Entitlement Age that occurs for 
people born on the second day of any month, we find evidence that people do not have single-
peaked preferences over claiming age: relaxing the early retirement constraint leads to 
acceleration of retirement by some people for whom the constraint would not be otherwise 
binding. One possible explanation for this pattern is a preference for retiring at one's birthday. 
We take advantage of a change in the full retirement age and find that there remains unusually 
large (relative to other birthdays) number of people who claim around their 65th birthday, 
supporting the idea that Medicare eligibility has an impact on claiming retirement benefits. 
Finally, we confirm that elimination of the earnings test in 2000 for those above full retirement 
age accelerated retirements and find that it also led to a significant weakening of the January 
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Our general objective is to estimate the e￿ect of retirement incentives on the timing
of retirement. The unique feature of this study is exploiting information based on
administrative data covering the full U.S. population. The large sample and detailed
information about the date of birth allows for utilizing variation in incentives that
depends on the date of birth and exploiting retirement decisions on a monthly basis.
We focus on three types of incentives. First, we propose a novel strategy for esti-
mating the e￿ect of monetary bene￿ts. As discussed in detail below, peculiarities
of calculation of Social Security retirement bene￿ts imply that people born on the
second day of the month can retire in the same month as those born a day or more
earlier, but would then permanently receive somewhat lower bene￿ts because the
applicable number of reduction months applicable in computing their bene￿ts would
be higher. By taking advantage of the Master Bene￿ciary Records dataset covering
100% of the U.S. population, we can compare the decision to retire at the earliest
possible age across people born on di￿erent days of the month and infer the impact
of the monetary incentive.
Our second point of focus is to shed a light on the relevance of health insurance
on the timing of retirement. Most individuals become eligible for Medicare at age of
65. Retiring before that date may mean in many cases giving up employer-provided
insurance. Hence, individuals may have an incentive to delay the retirement date
until age of 65 for that reason. Changes in the full retirement age change the ￿nancial
incentives to retire at 65 and therefore provide an opportunity to disentangle the
e￿ect of full retirement age from the e￿ect of availability of Medicare for the decision
1to retire.
Third, the elimination of the earnings test in 2000 for people above the retirement
age increased the incentive to accelerate claiming bene￿ts and apply for bene￿ts at
the full retirement age.
Before focusing on incentive e￿ects, we discuss the patterns of retirement and
quality of the date of birth data available in the administrative databases main-
tained by the Social Security Administration. We ￿nd that there is non-trivial mis-
reporting or clerical errors in the reported dates of birth but that the errors appear
to be random. We further document patterns of retirement focusing on the so-called
￿January￿ e￿ect, retirements at birthdays, changes in retirement dates depending on
the date of birth and changes in these patterns over time.
2 Data
The data used in this project comes from the Master Bene￿ciary File. This is an
administrative database containing information about the universe of bene￿ciaries.
We obtained detailed tabulations from this database. Speci￿cally, for any date of
birth, the data contains the number of individuals (by gender), who retire at any
particular month (only the month is relevant as payment of bene￿ts and claiming
take place on a monthly basis). This is the information that we use in our analysis:
the unit of observation is the date of birth interacted with gender and for each cell
of this kind we observe the number of people retiring at each month.
The data covers cohorts born between 1931 and 1945 and includes information
2about the retirements that occurred up until march of 2008. However, information
for all of 2007 and beyond appears incomplete (as evidenced by the substantial drop
in the observed number of retirements) and hence we usually stop at the end of 2006.
The range of cohorts covered allows for analyzing changes in the earnings test and
expansion of the full retirement age.
While information comes from the administrative sources and pertains to the
very basic demographic information, there are still reasons for concern about the
quality of the data. First, information about the date of retirement is not entirely
unambiguous as individuals may be transferred to Social Security rolls from DI or
SSI, they can change their basis for claiming, may stop receiving bene￿ts after having
initially applied due to the retirement earnings test and so on.
Second, there are also problems related to the date of birth. Speci￿cally, we
observed that there are more than usual individuals who are born on certain dates
such as the ￿rst of any month, days when the number of the month and the day
are the same (1/1, 2/2, 3/3, 4/4 etc.) and 10 th and 20th of any month. Most
likely explanation of these patterns are clerical errors and, in fact as we discuss
later, there are good reasons to believe that those individuals are not aware of the
misrepresentation of their date of birth in the administrative data.
To illustrate the extent of this problem, we ran a regression of the log of the
total number of retirements observed in the data on dummies for gender, the year of
birth, the month of birth and the day of birth. If indeed dates of birth, as reported
in administrative data, were randomly distributed over the month, the coe￿cients
on the day dummies should be all close to zero. The estimated coe￿cients on the
3day-of-the-month dummies together with two standard-error bounds are shown on
Figure 1 (the omitted category is the third of the month). The coe￿cient on the
dummy for the ￿rst of the month is large and statistically very signi￿cant. It implies
that, apparently, about 5% more than expected individuals appear to be born on
the ￿rst day of a month. Other statistically signi￿cant coe￿cients correspond to the
10th, 15th and 20th of the month.
Close inspection of the data reveals additional inconsistencies. Including addi-
tionally dummies for the days of the month that are equal to the number of the
month (1/1, 2/2, 3/3) results in statistically signi￿cant and positive coe￿cients for
January 1st, February 2nd, March 3rd, April 4th, May 5th, October 10th, November
11th and December 12th (with dummies for the 1st, 10th, 15th and 20th remaining
signi￿cant).
Thus, it appears that dates of birth in the administrative data are not smoothly
distributed over the course of the year but rather feature unusual density at fairly
regular dates. While there may be retirement incentives to claim that the date
of birth is January 1st rather than some other day, it is hard to come up with a
good reason for why almost 4% more than expected individuals were claiming to
be or actually were born on April 4th. Hence, it appears that there are simple
clerical errors in the data that do not appear to be related to any incentives. This
observation does not of course eliminate the possibility that some of the errors are
in fact intentional and re￿ect the attempt to game the system. For example, being
born on the ￿rst or the second of the month allows for retiring earlier than any later
day and being born on January ￿rst is treated as if one was born in the prior year.
4To investigate the possibility that the mistakes are intentional, we observed that
individuals may have an incentive to report the date of birth as the ￿rst of the
month in order to claim bene￿ts earlier. If that was the case, then we would expect
that the number of individuals whose date of birth falls on the ￿rst of the month
and who retire at the Early Entitlement Age is higher than for other days. Figure
2 shows coe￿cients from regressing the log number of people retiring at the early
entitlement age on day, month, year and gender dummies. There is no evidence that
there is any e￿ect corresponding to the ￿rst of the month. This suggests that the
additional people who are observed as being born on the ￿rst do in fact retire at
later dates and hence do not take advantage of the bene￿t that earlier date of birth
accords. That does not fully exclude the possibility of there being manipulation
because conditional on any date of retirement there is a bene￿t of an earlier date
of birth due to a smaller number of reduction months, but it nevertheless would be
surprising if there was no response on the month of claiming margin. Perhaps the
most striking feature of Figure 2 is the e￿ect on the second of the month. This will
be the topic of the next section. It is also interesting to observe that there appears
to be an e￿ect over the course of the month, with individuals born in the latter part
of the month being more likely to delay retirement further. Figure 3 shows what
happens in the following month (i.e., one month after early eligibility) and there is
a clear reversal of the patterns then.
52.1 January and Birthday E￿ects
As will be discussed a bit later, the presence of a tendency to retire in January is
an important complication in understanding incentive e￿ects on retirement dates.
Before turning to these issues, we will ￿rst describe the magnitude and changes in
the January retirements.
Figure 4 shows the number of retirements by month of the year. It is obvious that
the number of retirements in January signi￿cantly exceeds the number of retirements
in any other month. In fact, it is approximately twice as large.
The presence of the January e￿ect is more than just a curiosity, because it is likely
to a￿ect how people respond to small changes in incentives. Much of empirical work
hinges on the assumption that small changes in incentives imply small changes in
behavior. However, if people exhibit strong tendency to retire in January, they will
retire in January for a range of retirement bene￿ts parameters. When the change
in incentives goes beyond that range, it is possible that their decision will not be
adjusted just a little bit but rather that they either will choose to retire at their
optimal date other than January or they will shift their retirement date by a full year
to the following or preceding January. Such lumpy responses require careful modeling
because they violate the implicit assumption in standard econometric frameworks
that marginal changes have marginal e￿ects.
The second salient feature of retirements is retiring at one’s birthday. Figure
5 shows the number of retirements over all years in the sample that occur at ages
between 62 and 2 months through 64 and 11 months. There is a clear pattern of
an increase in retirements occurring at or right after one’s birthday. The presence
6of such a pattern is interesting in the context of understanding the determinants
of bunching of individuals at the early and full retirement dates: as those dates
correspond to birthdays, the preference for retiring on a birthday may contribute to
the magnitude of retirements at those times.
3 Variation in retirement bene￿ts depending on the
date of birth
Individuals can choose to retire as early as at the age of 62 (early entitlement age
￿ EEA), foregoing part of their bene￿ts that depends on the number of months
until the full retirement age (FRA). For example, for cohorts born when FRA was 65
(cohorts born in 1937 or earlier), for most people, retiring at the earliest possible date
corresponds to a reduction of bene￿ts by 35 months multiplied by the appropriate
reduction factor.1 Why 35 and not 36 months?2 Retirement bene￿ts can be paid as
early as in the ￿rst month when a person is 62 throughout the whole month. On the
other hand, the person can receive full bene￿ts starting with the month when (s)he
reaches the full retirement age. For most people, the month following the month when
one reaches a given age is the ￿rst month when one is of that age throughout the
month, hence explaining why it is 35 and not 36 month reduction. More interestingly
for our purposes, there is an exception to that rule that applies to people born on
1The reduction factor of 5/9% applies to the ￿rst 36 months so that bene￿ts are reduced by
20% if somebody retires 36 months before turning 65. Each additional month of early retirement
(possible for cohorts born in 1938 or later when full retirement started to increase over 65, reduces
bene￿ts by 5/12%.
2See POMS Section RS 00615.015 - How the Day of Birth A￿ects Bene￿ts http:/policy.ssa.
gov/poms.nsf/links/0300615015 for more detailed discussion.
7the second of the month. Social Security follows English common law that ￿nds that
a person attains an age on the day before the birthday. As a result, people born
on the ￿rst of the month as treated as those born in the previous month (and those
born on January 1st are treated as if they were born in the previous year). People
who are born on the second of the month, attain any given age and are of that age
throughout the whole month in the same month. As a result, their early retirement
date is the same as the early retirement date of those born a day earlier but their
full retirement date is the same as that of those born a day later. Hence, if they
choose to retire at the earliest possible date, they can retire a month earlier than a
person born one day later and at the same time as the person born one day earlier,
but they will have their bene￿ts reduced by 36 months.
We will represent the reduced form of the utility from retiring at a given age a for
a person born on day d as a function of bene￿ts bd(a) as ud(a;bd(a)). It is a reduced
form of utility because we are subsuming other e￿ects (such as changes in the value
of employer provided pensions, disutility of working for an extra month, the e￿ect
of resulting earnings on consumption and so on) in the dependence of u on a and
we accounting for the impact of working an extra month on the bene￿ts through a
reduced form function bd(a). The optimization is performed over a and is subject to
the constraint that d + a  ed where ed is the earliest date when a person born on
date d can retire. For individuals who choose to retire at the earliest possible date
ed, the constraint is binding  =  du
da  0, where  denotes the multiplier on the
early retirement constraint.
Consider what happens when d corresponds to the second of the month. An
8increase in d corresponds to a change in ed by the full month accompanied by a small
and arguably negligible changes in schedules ud and bd due to the one day di￿erence
in the date of birth.3 Hence, by comparing people born on the second with those
born on the third and observing that a month of a reduction in the retirement age
corresponds to a reduction of bene￿ts by 5/9% or 5/12% (respectively, for those born
earlier than 1938 and those born after than 1937) we can estimate the population
elasticity of retirement with respect to a percentage change in retirement bene￿ts.
In other words, we can estimate how many individuals who locate on the constraint
would choose so even if the constraint was not binding.
The black lines on ￿gure 6 show the fraction of people retiring at the EEA as
a function of the date of birth. Red dots correspond to the second of the month.
It is fairly clear that people born on the second of the month retire at the earliest
possible age more rarely than others. At the same time, given that if they retired a
month later they would have faced exactly the same bene￿t reduction as anyone else
retiring at the earliest date, it is clear that only very few of them behave as if the
constraint was not binding.
A more formal measure of the size of the e￿ect is presented in Table 1. We show
the results of a regression of the log of the number of people retiring on the earliest
possible day (the unit of observation is the day of birth) on a set of year, month, sex
and day-of-the-month dummies. The omitted day-of-the-month dummy is for the
3There are cases where the e￿ect of a one day di￿erence in the date of birth may not be negligible
such as when it corresponds to crossing a threshold date for schooling or when there is a reason to
believe that population reported as being born on a given date is for some reason di￿erent. As was
discussed earlier, the latter factor is potentially an issue due to apparent errors and/or misreporting
of the date of birth.
9￿rst of the month and the coe￿cient of interest is the dummy for the second-of-the-
month. As can be easily expected based on the graphical representation of the date,
the dummy for the second-of-the-month is negative and very signi￿cant. Among
those born on the second of the month, approximately 6.6% fewer people choose to
retire at the earliest date than among those born on other days. This e￿ect is present
for both men and women, albeit it appears to be signi￿cantly weaker for women.
Cohorts born prior to 1938 faced the retirement age of 65 and the bene￿t reduction
for retiring a month earlier was equal to 5/9% of bene￿ts, while the reduction for
cohort born after 1937 is 5/12% of bene￿ts (because bene￿t reductions for months
beyond 36th month are lower). Hence, one may expect that the e￿ect should be
stronger for the older cohorts. While the coe￿cient is indeed more negative, the
di￿erence is very small. In not reported results of regressions year-by-year, there is
no clear annual pattern. This pattern casts doubt on bene￿ts as the explanation of
these patterns. A potential confounding factor might be due to the fact that the
overall bene￿t reduction for retiring at the EEA was higher (and increasing) starting
with the 1938 cohort. As a result, the composition of the population retiring around
the EEA and hence its responsiveness might have changed.
Another possibility is that the e￿ect does not re￿ect to a response to economic
incentives, but rather that not all people who are born on the second of the month
realize that they could retire earlier than others or follow a rule-of-thumb behavior.
A piece of supportive evidence for this fact is that analogous regression with the
log of the number of people retiring one month after the entitlement date as the
dependent variable implies that those born on the second of the month are over 70%
10more likely to retire a month after EEA than those born on the days that follow.
One explanation of this pattern may be of course that there are more that many
more people who optimally want to choose age of 62 years and one month relative
to those who want to optimally choose retirement age 62 years and one month, but
the magnitude of this e￿ect appears extremely large. Figure 7 illustrates it. The
number of people born on the second and retiring one month after 62nd birthday is
large and seemingly out-of-line with retirements in the months that follow.
Another way of testing whether the response is purely due to incentive structure
is to note that the incentives to retire at age older than 62 years and 1 month are
identical for those born on the second and others. Hence, if individuals optimize
their retirement age subject to a constraint (and if the objective function is convex)
there should be no di￿erence in behavior after that age. Similarly, retirements at
age of 62 by those born on the 2nd should simply re￿ect shifting from retirements
from age of 62 and 1 month and that can be easily tested by summing the number of
people retiring at 62 or 62 and 1 month to see whether it varies by the day of birth.
Table 2 shows the results of corresponding regressions. The number of people
retiring at age 62 or 62 and 1 month is higher among those born on the second of the
month. This by itself is inconsistent with everybody optimizing subject to having
unimodal preferences over retirement age: relaxing the early retirement constraint
should not change the number of people retiring at or before the unrelaxed constraint.
The observed pattern appears to indicate that some of the people who would have
retired after the EEA when the EEA is 62 years and 1 month, choose to retire at or
before 62 years and 1 month after the EEA is reduced by one month. The presence
11of such an e￿ect is further corroborated by the following rows of Table 2 that show
statistically signi￿cant reductions in the number of people retiring 2, 3 and 4 months
after their 62 birthday. There is also some evidence that the cumulative e￿ect might
even persist as long as a year after 62 birthday, however there is also some evidence
that the number of people with the day of birth reported as the second of the month
is slightly elevated. To control for this e￿ect (and preceding its explanation provided
later), similar regressions can be ran using the share of retirements in the overall
number of retirements after age of 62. These results are reported in Table 3. They
show similar pattern as discussed above: elevated number of retirements around the
relaxed constraint and reduction in the number of retirements in the following three
months; but they no longer show a longer term cumulative e￿ect. Hence, it appears
that some of the individuals who would have retired strictly after the EEA when it
is 62 years and 1 month, choose to accelerate the retirement when EEA is reduced
to 62 years.
The leading explanation for this ￿nding is the presence of a birthday e￿ect. In-
dividuals born on the second are provided with an opportunity to retire on their
birthday while others are not. Some of them appear to take advantage of it and
accelerate their retirement by a number of months.
124 Changes in retirement patterns following an in-
crease in FRA
Starting with the 1938 cohort, retiring at the age of 65 is no longer associated with
reaching the full retirement age. Hence, absent birthday e￿ect or other reasons to
retire precisely at one’s birthday, we should no longer expect an elevated number
of retirements at that date. As argued earlier, people do have a tendency though
to retire on birthdays. Figure 9 shows the number of retirements at 63rd through
66th birthdays by the date of birth. It is clear that following the increase in the
full retirement age, the number of retirements at the 65th birthday remains elevated
although of course still the number of retirements at that birthday drops precipitously
as people postpone retirement to the full retirement age.
On Figure 10 we show the (log of) the number of retirements by 1936 through
1941 cohorts. The key observation is that the number of retirements at or just before
65th birthday is signi￿cantly elevated for all cohorts and does not weaken or shift
very much for later cohorts that are a￿ected by the increase in the full retirement
age. The magnitude of the retirements around 65th birthday dwarfs slight increases
in retirements around 63rd or 64th birthdays. Figure 11 shows just the number of
retirements in the proximity of the 65th birthday. While there is possibly a little bit of
a decline in retirements occurring just before the 65th birthday, the e￿ect is not very
large and the tendency to retire just before or at 65th birthday remains very strong.
Therefore, it does appear that the neighborhood of age of 65 remains an important
point for retirements, despite the peak of retirements shifting to the FRA. This
13e￿ect is much stronger than the e￿ect at earlier ages and the fact that the pattern
of retirements preceding 65th birthday does not change much after FRA increases
suggests that retiring around 65th birthday has intrinsic value to individuals. The
leading candidate for explaining the e￿ect of this kind is availability of Medicare.
5 Impact of Elimination of the Earnings Test on the
January E￿ect
Figure 12 shows the coe￿cients from a regression of the log of the number of re-
tirements by date of birth and age at retirement, on day, month and year of birth
dummies, gender dummies and a set of dummies for the date of retirement falling
in January interacted with the year of birth. Two regressions were estimated: one
on retirements occurring between ages of 62 and 64 and another on retirements oc-
curring between 64 and 66. All of the coe￿cients are large and positive, re￿ecting
that the January e￿ect is well and alive for all cohorts. However, the coe￿cient falls
dramatically with the ￿rst cohort that was no longer subject to the Earnings Test
after turning 65 - the 1935 cohort - while no comparable e￿ect is present for those
retiring at earlier ages. A spike in January retirements occurring in 1934 most likely
re￿ects that individuals who were delaying retirement after turning 65, accelerated
it to take advantage of the elimination of the earnings test. These patterns strongly
suggest that the preference for retiring in January can be dominated by economic
considerations.
146 Conclusion
In this paper we presented initial and not yet complete analysis of the monthly
patterns of retirements and linked them to retirement incentives. By relying on the
administrative data, we were able to exploit minor di￿erences in retirement incentives
that are present depending on the precise day of birth and show suggestive evidence
of ￿lumpy￿ responses. We also documented the presence of signi￿cant birthday and
January e￿ects. Despite the general presence of the birthday e￿ect, we showed that
retirements around age 65 are unusual and in fact do not change much following the
increase in the FRA (other than, of course, the shift of the peak of retirements to the
new FRA). This suggests that the 65th birthday plays an important role for reasons
not related to the FRA, with the leading candidate being eligibility for Medicare. As
a result, it appears likely that retirements are in fact postponed for health insurance
reasons. Finally, we showed that the peak of retirements occurring in January is
in fact responsive to economic considerations, in particular that it did respond to
elimination of the earnings test.
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Table 2: Structure of early retirement response ￿ number of retirements
2nd of the month e￿ect relative to 3 rd of the month
Direct e￿ect (at that month)Cumulative e￿ect (since 62)
Retiring at 62 or 62 and 1 month 0.0166127
(0:0041257)
Retiring at 62 and 2 months -0.0837979 0.014394
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(0:0220328) (0:0041226)
Retiring at 62 and 5 months 0.0178099 0.0106271
(0:0225146) (0:004097)
Retiring before 63rd birthday 0.0099118
(0:0040506)
Number of people overall 0.0076231
(0:0044366)
18Table 3: Structure of early retirement response ￿ share of retirements
2nd of the month e￿ect relative to 3 rd of the month
Direct e￿ect (at that month)Cumulative e￿ect (since 62)
Retiring at 62 or 62 and 1 month 0.0042864
(0:0015547)
Retiring at 62 and 2 months -0.001457 0.0028294
(0:0006033) (0:0015954)
Retiring at 62 and 3 months -0.0009837 .0018456
(0:0004793) (0:0016346)
Retiring at 62 and 4 months -0.0007256 0.0011200
(0:0004092) (0:0016646)
Retiring at 62 and 5 months 0.0000163 0.0016646
(0:000351) (0:0:0016646)
Retiring before 63rd birthday 0.0016646
(0:001786)
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